Do Populist Governments Always Crash the Economy?
“Exchange, exchange.” Under the blazing sun, dozens of currency traders are hawking US dollars along Florida Street, a bustling shopping street in Buenos Aires. Referred to as arbolitos (“little trees”), they are thriving before the 26 October congressional elections in a nation long used to holding the greenback.
“The best time to buy is now,” states one arbolito, declining to give her identity. “[The dollar] dropped a little but it is a fake-out – it’ll rise again.”
Like her, economists from all backgrounds expect a depreciation of the national currency after the election concludes. President Javier Milei has placed a limit on the peso to control triple-digit inflation and currently it is artificially high and reserves are depleted, leaving the national economy stagnant as buyers opt for cheap imports.
Ideal Conditions
Argentina represents a unique situation. The country has been repeatedly racked by sovereign defaults and economic crises and the electorate have been receptive over the years to leftwing populism, such as the powerful Peronist movement, and currently the president’s conservative populism.
Milei epitomizes populist leadership: captivating, iconoclastic, promising muscular policies to wrestle back control of the economy from the establishment on behalf of ordinary citizens.
These defining traits are also seen in his ally to the north, as well as Nigel Farage, who presents himself as a beer-drinking people’s champion even though he is a public school-educated ex-finance professional.
Up until lately, Milei’s approach – including extensive privatisations and severe budget reductions – had earned praise from international lenders for contributing to bring price rises in check. This plan shares similarities with that of Milei’s idol the former UK prime minister, who also saw rising prices as a dragon to be defeated, no matter the cost.
However investors began losing confidence in Milei’s radical project in recent months after a poor performance in provincial elections and a series of graft allegations. Solely large-scale economic support by the US has averted what looked set to become a full-blown currency crisis.
Contradictions
The 2016 referendum in 2016 arguably had some of the same logic, and its leader, Boris Johnson, swept away doubts regarding fiscal impacts with confident resolve to enact the “will of the people” despite elite opposition.
Farage to date committed few policies in writing aside from a call for large-scale removals, which he subsequently seemed to adjust spontaneously. He aims to curb the central bank, perhaps even replacing its head, the incumbent, with distrust toward traditional institutions being a key part of populist rhetoric.
His tax and spending policies appear to be in flux: wary of facing criticism for proposing a Liz Truss-style splurge, he recently abandoned a pledge to make large tax reductions. His second-in-command, Richard Tice, said they would concentrate instead on reductions in government expenditure.
The opposition hopes this position will allow it to portray the populist as planning to reintroduce austerity – a point Rachel Reeves has made repeatedly, contrasting it with her strategy of increasing government spending.
Jo Michell notes there are contradictions within the populist platform, as it stands. “The party is funded by affluent backers demanding tax cuts and deregulation, yet also emphasizing the complaints of ordinary workers and the loss in manufacturing employment,” he says. “There is a conflict here between wealthy supporters who want radical free-market policies, and this story of bringing back British jobs and industrial revival.”
Maintaining Control
Realistically, the evidence indicates neither left nor right populists often perform poorly when faced with real-world challenges (though of course each charismatic individual claims to offer something unique).
Recent research from a leading journal examined the outcomes of 51 populist presidents and prime ministers, over more than a century. It found that on average, over the long term, gross domestic product per head tends to be 10% lower in countries run by populist leaders compared to comparable countries under conventional leadership.
“Economic disintegration, decreasing macroeconomic stability and the decay of governance typically go hand in hand with populist rule,” argue the researchers.
Another intriguing finding from the study, though, is that despite their economic costs, these leaders tend to be good at holding on to power, remaining in power for a considerable time, compared with four for their more moderate equivalents.
Put simply, it remains uncertain whether even if their policies fail, populists immediately pay the price in elections. Like the Brexiters’ promise to regain sovereignty, their appeal extends past mundane economics.
But back in Buenos Aires, whether the government’s agenda collapses or is kept on life support by external aid, Argentina’s citizens are already bearing a heavy price.